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Abstract
In the last several years, a group of youths calling themselves Malibu Locals Only 
or MLO has performed several violent crimes, intimidating many people in the area 
around Malibu, CA.  Despite the gang-like appearance of these youths and their crimes, 
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department officials insist that MLO is not a gang.  This 
article examines MLO, its history, and its current state in the context of California anti-
gang legislation.   
 The article theorizes that the criminal justice system's failure to call a group like 
MLO a gang while waging war on other groups, primarily in lower income, heavily 
minority areas, hurts the effort at fighting gangs in two ways.  First, it places too much 
emphasis on factors like poverty, institutionalization and the media, which have been 
traditionally thought to be the greatest influences on youths' decisions to join gangs.  This 
improper emphasis, in turn, causes society to ignore more relevant factors like missing 
support from family members and other responsible adults.  Second, the failure to 
classify MLO as a gang while aggressively attacking primarily minority gangs makes the 
anti-gang tools that law enforcement uses, such as the STEP Act and civil gang 
injunctions, constitutionally questionable.  
 In conclusion, the article will propose solutions to address both of the above 
concerns.  In particular, society must address the "missing protector factor" to keep 
youths from joining gangs in the first place.  In addition, the criminal justice system must 
ensure that it enforces laws equally or provides explanations for distinctions so as to 
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Malibu Locals Only:  "Boys will be boys", or dangerous street gang?  
Why the criminal justice system's failure to properly identify suburban 
gangs hurts efforts at fighting gangs.
Foreword
In 2004, at an otherwise average Southern California house party, a group of 
youths attacked and beat another teenager without apparent provocation, nearly killing 
the young man and leaving him with permanently limited mental function.1 The attackers 
threatened to kill witnesses if they told police.2 Additionally, reports circulated shortly 
thereafter that a group of youths approached a couple who was walking along the beach 
and asked the couple where they were from.  When the couple replied that they were 
from Canoga Park,3 the youths attacked and beat them.4
Initially, these stories seem unremarkable when compared to the daily barrage of 
violent images and gang-related horror stories shown in films and news media.  However, 
the attacks are notable for several reasons.  First, they occurred in Malibu, California, a 
 
1 The young man, a promising high school student, was, according to doctors, beaten "nearly to death."  To 
this day, the young man suffers from debilitating headaches and spinal injuries.  He has been forced to 
forego college scholarships due to his inability to concentrate for extended periods caused by the beating.  
Vicki Godal, Malibu Gang Investigation to Air on Major Local Television Station, THE MALIBU TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2004, available at http://www.malibutimes.com/articles/2004/02/12/news/news3.txt; See also, 
Craig Stephens, MLO—Malibu Locals Only Gang, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, May 2004, available at 
http://www.craig-stephens.com/doc_entwkly_mlo.html (victim lost scholarship to college because injuries 
render him unable to maintain focus on difficult tasks). 
2 See Godal supra note 1 (gang threatens witnesses at party, "If you tell anyone or do anything, we're going 
to kill you! We know where you live!"). 
3 Canoga Park is in the San Fernando Valley area of Los Angeles.  Since crowds started to flock to Malibu 
to take advantages of its beaches and surf breaks, there has been tension between the people who live in 
Malibu and people who live in the San Fernando Valley, only 15 miles inland. Lynn Langway and Neal 
Karlen, Attack of the Wannabees, NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1981, available at 
http://www.nealkarlen.com/articles/newsweek/wannabees.shtml. 
4 Malibu surfers suggest that the Canoga Park man disrespected the local beaches and, thus, ran afoul of the 
group of Malibu youths.  Jamie Tierney, Malibu's Least Wanted: Meet So Cal's Low Profile, High Income 
Surf Gang, at http://surfingthemag.com/news/surfing-pulse/032904_malibu. 
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city more frequently associated with its rich and famous residents than with brutal 
crimes.5 Second, the attacks were allegedly performed by a gang called Malibu Locals 
Only (hereinafter MLO), whose members are alleged to include children of some of these 
wealthy and famous Malibu residents.6 Third, authorities never filed criminal charges 
against any of the gang members even though the gang nearly beat one victim to death.7
Lastly, Los Angeles County Sheriff's spokespeople in Malibu repeatedly assured 
concerned citizens that MLO was not a gang.8
VII. Introduction 
 Admittedly, MLO is not well-known and may not initially resemble the type of 
gang that inspires fear in the average person9. Malibu does not suffer from the 
astonishing crime rates seen in Los Angeles areas like Compton, where gangs are more 
notorious and institutionalized.10 Also, MLO violence has not yet claimed any lives.  
 
5 From Sep. to Dec. of 2005, the median price for home sales in the Malibu zip code 90265 was $2.95 
million.  See http://www.malibutimes.com/real_estate/malibu_real_estate_report/.  The average per capita 
income for the city is $74336, with only 3.2 percent of families reporting income below the poverty line. 
Wikipedia, at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malibu,_California#Demographics; Compare these figures with 
Compton, CA, The per capita income for the city is $10,389. 28.0% of the population and 25.5% of 
families are below the poverty line.  Wikipedia, at . http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compton%2C_CA. 
6 See Craig Stephens supra note 1 (Brawley Nolte and Ed Gibson, sons of well-known actors Nick Nolte 
and Mel Gibson are members of MLO).   
7 See Vicki Godal supra, note 1 (some parents refused to report the incident, fearing more violence for their 
children);  In the first reported beating, the attackers used a Mag-Lite brand flashlight as a weapon.  See 
Jamie Tierney supra note 4; See also, Wikipedia at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Club_(weapon)#Maglite 
(many policemen carry, use Mag-Lites as clubs though specifically discouraged from doing so).  
8 In an interview with Craig Stephens, a writer for Entertainment Weekly, Los Angeles County Sheriff's 
Department Detective John Manwell stated, "This is simply a local group of kids, and it really doesn't come 
close to being classified as a gang. There are very definite rules relating to what constitutes a gang, and the 
MLO does not really come close to fitting that classification."  See Craig Stephens supra  note 1; See also,
MALIBU CITY COUNCIL, MINUTES OF REGULAR MEETING, at 6 (July 25, 2005) (Deputy Paladino assures 
City Council that MLO is not a gang, but rather territorial youth).  
9 The title of Jamie Tierney's article, "Malibu's Least Wanted" is a play on the title of a 2003 movie, 
"Malibu's Most Wanted."  This movie was a spoof of a rich, Malibu youth trying to live a gangster lifestyle. 
See Jamie Tierney supra note 4; MALIBU'S MOST WANTED (Warner Bros. 2003). 
10 It is useful, for example, to compare the violent crime rates in Malibu, CA and Compton, CA, a city in 
the Los Angeles area widely known for its gang activity.  In 2004, Malibu reported 0 murders per 100,000 
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Nonetheless, it is troubling that the gang status of this group, which meets the relevant 
criteria listed in the California Criminal Code for defining a gang,11 is immediately 
dismissed while the criminal justice system has declared open war on other, similar 
groups that perform similar criminal activity in the inner-cities.   
 This failure by law enforcement officials like the Los Angeles County Sheriff's 
Department to recognize MLO as a gang harms efforts at fighting gangs and gang 
violence.  This harm arises because MLO represents a trend in gang violence that has 
emerged not only in the United States, but around the world for the past 20 years.12 
Specifically, while society has often erroneously focused on gangs as an exclusively 
urban problem, the more affluent suburbs have experienced significant increases in the 
formation of gangs.   
 The focus of this paper is not merely to sound the alarm that the youth gang 
plague has landed in Middle America's backyard.  Rather, the paper seeks to illustrate the 
criminal justice system's flawed approaches to identifying factors that lead to gang 
membership.  In turn, the paper will demonstrate how the failure to identify these factors 
harms society's efforts at preventing gang violence in both suburban and urban settings.  
By making false distinctions between gangs and non-gangs when the predominant 
apparent distinction is urban versus suburban or affluent versus non-affluent, the criminal 
justice system fails to address important underlying issues that cause gangs to form.  This 
error causes society to ignore valuable potential solutions to the gang problem.  
 
citizens, as compared to Compton's 40.2.  The national average was 5.5 murders per 100,000 citizens.  In 
the same period,  Malibu experienced 239.2 aggravated assaults, while Compton experienced 1063.5.  The 
national average was 291.2 per 100,000.  Crime Rate Comparison, at 
http://losangeles.areaconnect.com/crime/compare.htm?c1=malibu&s1=CA&c2=compton&s2=CA. 
11 Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22 (f). 
12 TEEN GANGS: A GLOBAL VIEW (Maureen P. Duffy and Scott Edward Gillig, eds.) (2004). 
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Additionally, the false distinction between suburban and urban gangs harms existing 
efforts at fighting gang violence, as it may help perpetuate the appearance of inherent 
racism in the criminal justice system.    
 By examining MLO and the related phenomenon of the formation of suburban 
gangs, this paper will explore several areas of gang development.  First, the paper will 
discuss MLO, including its history and goals.  Second, the paper will contrast MLO and 
its formation with traditional notions of street gangs and why youths join them.  Third, 
the paper will address specific challenges society faces in its war on gangs—prevention 
of gang membership and effectively fighting gangs once youths are in them.  Finally, the 
paper will propose solutions,  based upon what MLO and similar suburban gangs 
illustrate, to help prevent gang membership and to ensure the criminal justice system's 
fair and effective use of anti-gang tools in its fight against gangs.   
 
VIII. Who is MLO? 
 In the late 1960's, a tight-knit group of Malibu surfers began to organize to 
accomplish two goals.  Originally, the group sought to protect access to the private 
Malibu beaches from surfers from the San Fernando Valley and other areas of Los 
Angeles.13 Later, the organization evolved to promote a second goal—the protection of 
its high school members from rival Mexican gangs.14 Although the organization began as 
a loose consortium, the group began to adopt more of a gang persona in this effort.  
Where Mexican gangs carved graffiti at school, the Malibu group began to assert their 
 
13 This information comes from e-mail correspondence with a founding member of MLO who wished to 
remain anonymous.  Email from anonymous MLO founder, to Brian W. Ludeke (Jan. 27, 2006, 10:28 PST) 
(on file with author). 
14 Malibu High School did not open until 1992.  Before that time, Malibu residents' children attended Santa 
Monica and Olympic High Schools.  Id. 
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claim to the same territory by carving the initials "MLO" over the Mexican gangs' 
insignia.15 Thus, MLO was born16.
As to MLO's original goal, a former founding member of MLO17 stated that the 
protectionist attitude toward the Malibu beaches stemmed from Malibu residents' 
perception that they had sole responsibility for protecting private property rights attached 
to the local beaches:   
Right or wrong, there was no public access to GREAT surf breaks. To 
surf at OUR beaches if you were not a "local" you had to criminal [sic] 
trespass across well posted private property. It would be EXACTLY like 
someone climbing the fence and going through your yard wherever you 
live because they want to go somewhere on the other side or your 
property. Although trespassers would get arrested or cited every now 
and then, it was not considered a high priority call by the police . . . As 
most of Malibu's police force lived in the valley or town, I feel they 
were often symphetic [sic] to the trespassers . 18 
Thus, MLO became something akin to a substitute police force with respect to the Malibu 
beaches.19 
As to MLO's second goal, Malibu did not have its own high school until 1992, so 
Malibu teens attended school in neighboring communities.20 The surfers' appearance 
 
15 Id. 
16 For sake of brevity, this paper will refer to the gang as MLO even in their early incarnation when the 
"gang" had not necessarily formed as such. 
17 See MLO Founder Email supra note 13. 
18 Id. 
19 Local surfers' protection of their territory is a common practice.  Beaches with conditions amenable to 
surfing represent only a small portion of the California coastline.  These areas are referred to as "surf 
breaks."  When a wave breaks at one of these spots, there is generally only room for one surfer to ride on 
that wave.  Thus, surfers have always had a keen interest in keeping crowds down at surf breaks.  See, e.g., 
Nat Young, SURF RAGE, Gardners Publishing (2000) (violence at surf spots has become a global concern, 
and waves at surf breaks are a finite resource that some surfers will protect with violence);  To this day, 
violence at breaks deemed by local surfers as "locals only" breaks is not at all uncommon.  Of note is a 
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Protection Act injunction sought against a group of Palos Verdes surfers 
calling themselves the Dirty Underwear Gang for an assault on a non-local surfer.  Kevin Cody, PVE 
Police Meets with Surfrider, at http://www.streetgangs.com/injunctions/topics/011702dirty.html. 
20 See MLO Founder Email supra note 13. 
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made them stand out at the more urban schools, 21 making them targets for harassment by 
Mexican gangs.22 "[I]f they were to survive, with a shred of dignity itact, [sic] the 
Malibu enforcers had to become a little more organized and vigilant about the leave the 
Malibu people alone rule [sic]."  MLO's added organization provided its members with 
strength in numbers to protect themselves from the already organized Mexican gangs.23 
MLO may have originated as a group of peers organizing to protect their beaches 
and themselves.  However, MLO has evolved into a gang with less innocent goals, now 
behaving much more like a stereotypical modern street gang.  Malibu beaches are now 
public, so MLO members no longer enforce property rights.24 Additionally, the Malibu 
community now has its own high school, so MLO members don't form a visible minority 
at their schools as did their predecessors.25 
Although the original impetus for MLO's formation has disappeared, MLO has 
not.  The gang now performs random, violent attacks on innocent non-gang members as 
evidenced by the aforementioned attacks.  .26 Modern MLO behavior now typifies the 
random, senseless violence seen from street gangs in cities across America.  Additionally, 
drivers through the canyons leading from the San Fernando Valley to Malibu are 
frequently greeted with MLO graffiti  Ironically, in spite of Los Angeles Sheriff's 
officials' assertions to the contrary, MLO has evolved into the very type of street gang 
 
21 Surfers in the 1960's and 1970's were predominantly white.  "Surfing would not be immune to the dark 
days of Vietnam, and in the late '60s, after a long period of quality public image, the pursuit ducked 
alongside rock and roll into the counter-culture. Hair grew out and acid was dropped . . . "  Surf Culture, at 
http://www.surfline.com/surfaz/surfaz.cfm?id=916.  
22 See MLO Founder Email supra note 13. 
23 Id. 
24 Proposition 20, the California Coastal Initiative, provided for public access to California beaches.  
California Coastal Commission, Permanent Responsibilities of the California Coastal Commission, at 
http://www.coastal.ca.gov/perresp.html. 
25 See, e.g., Trevor Delaney, Smells Like Teen Spirit, SMARTMONEY.COM, September 9, 2003, at 
http://www.smartmoney.com/magportfolios/stocks/index.cfm?story=september03 (PacSun, a nationwide 
retailer of surf clothing, enjoyed a 132% return during a three-year period when the S&P index fell 34%). 
26 See, e.g., Tierney supra note 4 (MLO graffiti appearing throughout Malibu to intimidate outsiders). 
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against which it originally formed to fight.  The MLO founder bemoans the situation in 
which "[MLO] decline[d] into the current state of the little bitches, that "jump" people 
like the Mexicans did when I was in school . . . If I was still up there I'd bitch slap some 
sense into them."27 
Because MLO has evolved to behave like a typical street gang, it is important to 
formulate a precise, relevant definition of the term "gang."  Furthermore, to understand 
what causes youths to join gangs like MLO, it is important to discuss factors in gang 
membership.  By carefully defining gangs and addressing what causes youths to join 
them, the criminal justice system can more effectively prevent gang membership and 
gang violence. 
 
IX. Traditional notions of gangs and reasons kids join. 
 Because MLO now exhibits such unpredictable, violent, gang-like behavior, it is 
important to discuss whether Sheriff's Department officials are correct in their insistence 
that MLO is not a gang.  To do so, it is useful to first define the term "gang" by looking at 
the relevant law used in California to fight street gangs.  Next, this section will examine 
popularly-held notions of factors that cause youths to join street gangs and will explain 
why these factors generally cannot fully explain gang membership in either urban or 
suburban contexts.  Lastly, this section will address the "missing protector factor" which 
helps explain youths' decisions to join not only suburban gangs like MLO, but street 
gangs in general.  Because this factor is more universally relevant to gang membership, it 
is the most useful factor to address in efforts to prevent gang membership. 
 
27 See MLO Founder Email supra note 13.. 
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a. What is a gang? 
 In public statements and town meetings, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department 
officials have carefully and repeatedly assured troubled Malibu residents and parents that 
MLO is not a gang.28 This deliberate distinction between gangs and non-gangs raises a 
key issue with respect to society's efforts at fighting the violence committed by gangs.  
To combat gang violence, the criminal justice system has implemented powerful anti-
gang tools.  For example, the California legislature enacted the Street Terrorism 
Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act), which essentially criminalizes certain types 
of gang activities and allows sentence enhancements for gang members.29 Additionally, 
Los Angeles County has adopted a practice of obtaining civil injunctions to forbid 
enjoined gang members from many otherwise legal activities.30 Tools like these raise 
concerns about law enforcement officials' infringement on individuals' rights—
specifically the criminal justice system's criminalization of certain types of otherwise 
constitutionally protected behavior in the interest of preventing gang violence.  Because 
of these constitutional concerns, a precise definition of what constitutes a gang becomes 
especially crucial. 
 
28 See Malibu Town Meeting Minutes supra note 8. 
29 The STEP Act essentially enables California law enforcement officials to criminalize the act of 
belonging to a gang.  If prosecutors prove a defendant belongs to a gang, they can seek injunctions and 
sentence enhancements based on this gang membership.  Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22. 
30 In its final report for 2003-04, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury discussed the background and 
effectiveness of Los Angeles law enforcement officials' use of civil gang injunctions.  With these 
injunctions, prosecutors, working in conjunction with police can name gangs and gang members in a 
proposed injunctive order that can forbid otherwise legal behavior like association in public with other gang 
members.  If granted, the order is enforceable through the court's contempt power, enabling fines or prison 
for violators.  2003-04 LOS ANGELES COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, at 169-251, available at 
http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/gjreports.html. 
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In spite of this need for precision, there exists a great amount of debate as to a 
precise definition of a street gang.31 Nonetheless, in MLO's case, the definition provided 
by the STEP Act provides the most relevant definition because the aforementioned 
statements of assurance of MLO's non-gang status were made by California law 
enforcement officials.  The STEP Act, as set forth in California Penal Code § 186.22(f) 
defines a gang as follows: 
 [A]ny ongoing organization, association or group of three or more persons . . . 
 having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the 
 criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (8), inclusive, of subdivision (e), 
 which has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, whose 
 members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of 
 criminal gang activity.32 
The enumerated acts to which this section refers include "[a]ssault with a deadly weapon 
or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury"33 and "intimidation of 
witnesses and victims . . . "34 
If a group meets these criteria, California law enforcement officials may utilize 
the STEP Act to criminalize gang behavior and enhance penalties for crimes committed 
to further the gang.35 Additionally, with the same criteria, law enforcement officials in 
Los Angeles could seek a civil injunction to prevent gang members from assembling 
together in public.36 With such powerful tools available for use against gangs, California 
 
31 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility and the Criminalization of Youth Gangs, 28 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 951 (1993) (in spite of need to avoid indiscriminate war on gangs, prosecutors, 
legislators and academics fail to adequately define "gangs"). 
32 Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(f). 
33 Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22 (e)(1). 
34 Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22 (e)(7). 
35 Cal. Pen. Code §186.22 (a); Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22 (a)(1). 
36 See Los Angeles Civil Grand Jury Report supra note 30; See also, Jeffrey Grogger, The Effects of Civil 
Gang Injunctions on Reported Violent Crime:  Evidence From Los Angeles County, 45 J.L. & ECON. 69 
(2002). 
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law enforcement officials must ensure fairness in their decisions whether to classify 
groups as gangs.   
 MLO meets these criteria as set forth in the STEP Act and as used in civil 
injunctions.    With respect to the required number of members under the Act, Malibu 
High School principal Mark Kelly acknowledged the gang maintained a presence on that 
campus,37 and the reports of MLO assaults place the gang's membership above the 
necessary three required by the STEP Act.38 The gang uses a common identifier, 
"Malibu Locals Only" or "MLO", and the gang frequently uses graffiti to demarcate 
MLO territory.39 MLO members associate to commit criminal activity, including the 
predicate acts as listed in California Penal Code § 186.22.40 Thus, MLO meets the 
relevant criteria to be defined as a gang in California. 
 Because MLO, thus, appears to be the type of dangerous group the California 
legislature seemed to want to stop in enacting the STEP Act, Sheriff's Department 
officials could likely prosecute MLO under the Act or obtain a civil injunction against the 
gang.  The Sheriff's Department's failure to take such action or even classify MLO as a 
gang makes the distinction between MLO and other gangs suspect.  While MLO commits 
violent, gang-like crimes, Sheriff's officials have discounted the crimes, labeling them 
simply as acts committed by "territorial youth" at "house parties with out-of-town 
 
37 Email from Mark Kelly, Principal, Malibu High School, to Brian W. Ludeke (Feb. 15, 2006, 18:09 PST); 
See also, Vicki Godal supra note 1. 
38 See Vicki Godal supra note 1. 
39 See Jamie Tierney supra note 4; See also MLO Founder Email supra note 13 (MLO has done this since 
the 1970's). 
40 For example, in the aforementioned party assault, gang members committed a violent assault with a 
deadly weapon, intending to (and succeeding in) committing grave injury to the victim.  Furthermore, the 
gang members involved in the assault told witnesses, including the victim, that they knew where they 
would lived and that they would kill them if the witnesses told police about the assault.  These acts 
constitute assault with a deadly weapon (maybe attempted murder) and witness intimidation.  See Vicki 
Godal supra note 1. 
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parents."41 Meanwhile, gangs from less affluent backgrounds that commit similar crimes 
are subject to stiff sentences under the STEP Act and injunctive orders barring them from 
associating with one another.42 This suspect distinction inhibits society's ability to 
prevent gang violence by placing too much focus on popularly-held notions of what 
constitutes a gang and what motivates gang membership.  This misplaced focus ignores 
other factors in youths' choices to join gangs that might allow society to more effectively 
fight gangs in both suburban and inner city gangs. 
 
b. Why do youths join street gangs? 
 There are many reasons why youths join gangs.  This section will explore the 
most popularly held notions of factors in gang membership and will discuss why these 
stereotypical factors are generally not useful to explain youths' membership in gangs—
either urban or suburban.  Additionally, this section will discuss a factor called the 
"missing protector factor" that is useful in explaining membership in both urban and 
suburban gangs.  By recognizing and addressing the importance of this factor, society 
may be able formulate viable solutions to eradicating this very powerful factor and 
fighting both suburban and urban gang membership. 
 Youths are thought to join street gangs for many reasons.  The first theory is that 
they may join gangs to promote a criminal enterprise like the sale of drugs as an 
 
41 See Malibu Town Meeting Minutes supra note 8. 
42 "Between 1987 and 2000, the City Attorney and District Attorney have attempted 24 [civil gang 
injunctions] within Los Angeles County."  Most of the injunctions included in a report on the injunctions 
were sought against black and Hispanic gangs like the Rolling 60's (a black Crips gang) and the Venice 13 
gang (a Hispanic gang affiliated with the Mexican Mafia prison gang.)  See Los Angeles Civil Grand Jury 
Report supra note 30:  See also, People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal.4th 1090 (Cal. 1997) (California 
Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of civil gang injunctions banning 38 alleged members of the 
Varrio Sureno Treces gang from congregating in public in the Rock Springs neighborhood of San Jose). 
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alternative to poverty.43 Second, youths may join gangs due to gangs' presence as 
institutions in their neighborhoods.44 Third, gangs may serve as a type of ethnic 
protection for a segment of society that feels it lacks protection from traditional sources 
like the police.45 Fourth, many people feel that youths are led to participation in gangs by 
violence in the media.46 Lastly, youths often join gangs as a response to the "missing 
protector factor," with the gangs functioning as surrogate families for youths who have 
non-existing or dysfunctional family support systems.47 
i. Gangs created by, or as an alternative to, poverty. 
 A popular belief is that gangs form in poor, often heavily minority-populated 
neighborhoods as a by-product of the poverty in those neighborhoods.48 Certainly, the 
gangs generally romanticized by the entertainment media come mainly from 
 
43 See, e.g., Michael K. Carlie, Into the Abyss: A Personal Journey into the World of Street Gangs (2002), 
at http://www.faculty.missouristate.edu/m/mkc096f/what_I_learned_about/GANGS/WHYFORM/ 
economic_deprivation.htm (if a community fails to provide legitimate opportunities for its children to earn 
money, they may organize to find ways to earn money for themselves. If no legitimate way to earn money 
is available, illegitimate ways will be found - and one way is through forming a gang).   
44 See, e.g., James Diego Vigil, Learning from Gangs: The Mexican American Experience (1997), at 
http://www.ericdigests.org/1997-4/gangs.htm (because a gang subculture now dominates the streets, 
youngsters who become street socialized must adjust and conform to the culture that these "street elites" 
have fashioned). 
45 "Mirande (1987) attributes the values of gang youths to the effects of systemic suppression of the 
Mexican American people, while Horowitz (1983) tends to emphasize the protective role that gang 
members play for others in their kinship and friendship networks."  Id. (quoting RUTH HOROWITZ, HONOR 
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN A CHICANO COMMUNITY (Rutgers University 
Press, 1983); ALFREDO MIRANDE, GRINGO JUSTICE (University of Notre Dame Press, 1987)).  
46 See, e.g., Joint Statement on the Impact of Entertainment Violence on Children to the Congressional 
Public Health Summit, 106th Cong. (July 26, 2000) (issued by American Academy of Pediatrics, in 
conjunction with the American Medical Association, American Psychological Association, and American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry) (conclusion of the public health community, based on over 
30 years of research, is that viewing entertainment violence can lead to increases in aggressive attitudes, 
values and behavior, particularly in children). 
47 See, e.g., DAN KOREM, SUBURBAN GANGS: THE AFFLUENT REBELS 63 (Int'l Focus Press 1994) (The 
missing protector factor causes youths join gangs when they cannot count on parents in crisis). 
48 See, e.g., Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Los_Angeles (poverty and urban decay create 
crime in gang-ridden South Los Angeles). 
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economically depressed neighborhoods like Compton, California.49 In these 
neighborhoods, a common conception is that poverty may make gang-related crimes like 
drug sales attractive to poor youths seeking an escape from poverty.50 
Indeed, the introduction of crack cocaine to the American drug market has had a 
profound impact on society—particularly the inner city.  Crack combines dual, 
devastating qualities:  it is highly addictive and very affordable.51 Thus, drugs like crack 
provide a tremendous business opportunity to gangs willing to exploit this marketability.  
The epidemic of crack addiction and its corresponding sales by gangs have been evident 
in neighborhoods like Compton.52 The astounding amount of money involved in the 
crack industry translates to the perception that gangs provide prospective members with 
the opportunity to avoid the poverty common in these neighborhoods.53 For example, in 
Compton, 28 percent of the population earns wages below the poverty level.54 
Although avoiding such poverty may factor into youths' decisions to join gangs in 
depressed areas like Compton, the existence of suburban gangs like MLO shows that 
 
49 "[Compton] has at times been notorious for gang violence, a reputation perhaps exaggerated by the rise 
to prominence of local gangsta rap group N.W.A. during the 1980s."  Wikipedia, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compton,_California; Interestingly, Compton did not always possess such a 
fearsome reputation.  The city was once considered attractive to middle class citizens and was once home 
to two future U.S. Presidents in 1949-1950—George H.W. and George W. Bush.  Ibid. 
50 See Michael K. Carlie supra note 43. 
51 Crack is a highly addictive, smoked form of cocaine. National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIDA InfoFacts: 
Crack and Cocaine, at  http://www.nida.nih.gov/Infofacts/cocaine.html; See also, Crack Cocaine, at 
http://www.streetdrugs.org/crack.htm (cocaine in this form provides intense euphoria for users, increasing  
likelihood of compulsive cocaine-seeking behavior); See also, United States Department of Justice, Crack 
Cocaine Fast Facts, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs3/3978/3978p.pdf (crack easily abused because it is 
powerful and can be administered in inexpensive quantities). 
52 See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, 
available at  http://www.ussc.gov/crack/CHAP4.HTM (Los Angeles cultural gangs like the Crips and 
Bloods are the primary distributors of crack in Los Angeles). 
53 See Michael K. Carlie supra note 43. 
54 Wikipedia, at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compton%2C_California; See also, Joseph Rodriguez, Gang 
Life in Los Angeles: The East Side Story, THE APF REPORTER, Vol. 16, #2 (1994) available at 
http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF1602/Rodriguez/Rodriguez.html (East L.A. has long been a neglected 
neighborhood, with a predominantly Mexican population. It has one of the nation's highest school drop-out 
rates, and youth unemployment hovers at 75 percent.) 
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poverty cannot stand alone as the dispositive factor in gang membership.  In 
neighborhoods like Malibu, where the median income is far above the national average,55 
poverty cannot influence the decision to join a gang.  Furthermore, even in poor 
neighborhoods where gangs are prevalent, the majority of youths do not join gangs.56 If 
poverty were a reliable indicator of a youth's likelihood to join a gang, one would not see 
gangs forming in affluent communities like Malibu, and one would see a significantly 
higher percentage of youths in gangs in communities like Compton.  Thus, although 
poverty may be an important societal issue, it does not represent the most useful factor 
for law enforcement officials to address in the efforts at stopping gang violence.  
 
ii. Gangs as institutions in neighborhoods. 
 Some people theorize that gangs may become so institutionalized in  
neighborhoods that youths in those neighborhoods may feel they have no choice but to 
join gangs.57 This institutionalization can influence youths' decisions in two ways.  First, 
in many urban neighborhoods, gangs become so firmly entrenched in the fabric of the 
community that gang membership becomes akin to a family tradition.  In such situations, 
it is not uncommon to see second and third-generation gang members.58 Second, 
neighborhood gangs can infect neighborhoods to the extent that youths may feel 
 
55 See, e.g., Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malibu%2C_California#Demographics (Median 
Malibu household income is $102,031);  See also, Carmen DeNavas-Walt, et al., U.S. Census Bureau, 
Current Population Reports 60-221 (2002) (Median household income in United states is $42,409).  
56 See, e.g., Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in 
Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 Yale L.J. 2249, 2275 (1998) (most urban youths are not actual gang 
members). 
57 See James Diego Vigil supra note 44. 
58 A photograph in a magazine article by Joseph Rodriguez shows a particularly poignant example of 
families perpetuating gang membership.  The photo shows an East Los Angeles gang member teaching his 
two year old daughter to hold his pistol.  See Joseph Rodriguez supra note 54. 
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compelled to join in order to protect themselves from reprisal from the gangs for their 
refusal to join.59 
However, neither of these consequences of institutionalization can completely 
explain the formation of gangs in general, and they certainly don't explain why youths 
decide to join gangs in affluent communities like Malibu.  Paralleling the poverty factor, 
the institutionalization of gangs occurs frequently in poorer, urban neighborhoods.60 
However, like poverty, institutionalization does not cause every youth in these 
neighborhoods to join gangs.61 Furthermore, in suburban settings like Malibu, gangs like 
MLO have not become institutionalized like their urban counterparts.62 Although MLO 
has maintained a presence in Malibu since as far back as the late 1960's, it does not play 
the ominous role in the lives of Malibu residents as do gangs in areas like Compton, 
where gang violence is something with which residents cope as part of their everyday 
lives.63 Thus, institutionalization, like poverty, fails to fully explain youth gang 
membership—particularly in a suburban gang like MLO. 
 
iii. Gangs as ethnic self-protection 
 The explanations in Section II of MLO's genesis as a form of protection for 
Malibu teens and their "property" interests in the Malibu beaches are consistent with 
 
59 See, e.g., Steve Nawojczyk, Street Gang Dynamics (1997) at  
http://www.sfcasa.org/articles/street_gang_dynamics.htm  (many kids intimidated into gangs to avoid 
continued harassment).  
60 See KOREM, supra note 47, at 68. 
61 See Gary Stewart supra note 56. 
62 See KOREM, supra note 47, at 29. 
63 A chilling example of the gang violence that plagues the citizens of Compton is provided by the story of 
Osiel Hipolito.  Hipolito was home in Compton, on leave after serving in the U.S. Navy in Iraq.  While at a 
strip mall with his pregnant wife, Hipolito was attacked by two suspected gang members.  One of the 
attackers began shooting.  Hipolito was killed, and his wife wounded in the abdomen.  The bullet that hit 
his wife struck and injured the fetus.  Associated Press, Sailor on Leave from Iraq Killed by Suspected 
Gang Members, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, September 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20050905-2309-ca-sailorkilled.html.  
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another common theory on the origin of street gangs—that of gangs as a form of ethnic 
self-protection.64 Gangs arose in United States of America only shortly after its 
independence to provide protection to groups of people who felt that the law was either 
unable or unwilling to protect them.65 These vulnerable groups, often immigrants, felt 
the need to protect themselves from hostile people of other ethnicities who would come 
into their neighborhoods intending to do them harm.66 
As a modern example of this type of ethnic self-protection, one can examine 
gangs in East Los Angeles, which has a well-known history of gang violence.67 East Los 
Angeles' population is heavily Hispanic, and the constituency of most of the gangs in that 
area is correspondingly Hispanic.68 
These East Los Angeles gangs did not originally form with the purpose of 
terrorizing their own communities.  The East Los Angeles barrio gangs were originally 
formed by Mexican-American youths called Pachucos who often had to protect 
themselves from groups of white youths when law enforcement exhibited an 
 
64 See James Diego Vigil supra note 44. 
65 A recent film called "Gangs of New York" presented a vivid picture of gang activity in 19th century New 
York.  Although possibly exaggerated, the film was based on historically documented gangs that existed in 
the Five Points area of New York City.  Gangs controlled different municipal police agencies, creating 
conflict as to which police agency had power in which area.  To protect themselves, each gang had to 
provide its own protection, as it couldn't rely on the police to provide consistent, reliable protection.  
History of Gangs: 1850-1860, at http://www.knowgangs.com/gang_resources/history/history_004.htm; 
Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Rabbits; GANGS OF NEW YORK (Miramax 2002). 
66 See, e.g., Alexander A. Molina, California's Anti-Gang Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention 
Act: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 22 SW. U. L. REV. 457, 1993 (quoting Deborah Rowland, et al., 
Suburbs Waking Up to Threat of Gangs, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1991, § 1, at 16).   
67 See, e.g., Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boyle_Heights (by 1970's, Latino gangs becoming 
prevalent in Boyle Heights area of East Los Angeles); See also, Carol Ann Morrow, Jesuit Greg Boyle, 
Gang Priest, ST. ANTHONY MESSENGER, August 1999, available at 
http://www.americancatholic.org/Messenger/Aug1999/feature1.asp (60 gangs with 10,000 members in 16 
square mile area of East Los Angeles). 
68 See, e.g., Wikipedia, at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Los_Angeles_%28region%29 (since the early 
20th century, East Los Angeles is the locus of the Latino population of Los Angeles County);  
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unwillingness to provide protection.69 However the gangs did not retain their original, 
arguably noble goals.  In fact, they have not only shunned their original roles as 
protectors of their people, but have actually become enormous threats to their 
community.  The Pachucos who protected themselves and their communities from abuse 
evolved into the 18th Street Gang, who are responsible for hundreds of murders in Los 
Angeles.70 Furthermore, the 18th Street Gang has spread across the country and is now 
responsible for countless more acts of violence.71 
Similar to the 18th Street Gang, MLO came into existence to protect Malibu 
residents' property interests that were being violated by outsiders without intervention by 
authorities.72 Additionally, Malibu surfers, themselves visible minorities at their schools, 
had to organize to protect themselves from Mexican gangs that intended to harm them.73 
Thus, like the 18th Street Gang, MLO may have originally had noble, or at least rational, 
goals of protecting its community and its members.  However, similar to the 18th Street 
Gang, MLO has evolved into something completely different than a protector of its own 
ethnic group.  MLO has devolved into a gang that is feared not only by outsiders, but by  
 
69 An excellent example of this gang-like violence as self-protection is the Zoot Suit Riots of 1943.  In 
response to an alleged attack on whites by a group of "pachucos"-- Mexican-Amercian youths who were 
identified by their oversized, brightly colored "zoot suits"—Military personnel went, en masse, to East Los 
Angeles, beating Mexican-Americans.  In the end, several hundred Hispanics and only nine whites were 
arrested.  Governor's Citizen's Committee Report on Los Angeles Riots, The Zoot Suit Riots, 1943, 
available at http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/mexican_voices/voices_display.cfm?id=104; Wikipedia at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zoot_Suit_Riots.  
70 See, e.g., Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18th_Street_gang (18th Street Gang responsible for 
154 murders in Los Angeles from 1985 to 1995); See also, 18th Street Gang, at 
http://www.knowgangs.com/gang_resources/18th/18th_001.htm (18th Street linked to Mexican and 
Colombian drug cartels). 
71 See, e.g., Al Valdez, California's Most Dangerous Export (2000) at 
http://www.streetgangs.com/topics/2002/18thexport.html (Law enforcement officers have encountered 18th 
Street members in central and northern California, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, 
Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Nebraska, Iowa, Illinois, Georgia, and on Native American lands). 
72 See supra Section II. 
73 See MLO Founder Email supra note 13 
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its own community as well.74 As such, like its counterpart in East Los Angeles, MLO has 
followed a seemingly common metamorphosis away from the ethnic protection model.  
This common devolution across both suburban and urban contexts suggests that the 
ethnic protection factor is no longer useful as the primary explanation for the motivation 
of youths to join gangs. Because this factor no longer provides as clear an explanation for 
gang membership as it may have in the past, it no longer represents the most useful factor 
for society to address with respect to prevention of youth gang membership. 
 
iv. Gangs as the result of violence in the media. 
 When addressing the cause of modern gang violence, many people point to the 
prominent portrayal of gang violence in television, movies, and music.75 This theory 
seems to draw further support from the increasing prevalence, in both urban and suburban 
America, of fashions and imagery that are typically associated with gangs.76 
An area of study called Media Violence Research theorizes regarding this 
supposed link between media and gang membership.  Its proponents point to escalating 
levels of media violence and attempt to statistically tie this media violence to increases in 
actual violence in society.  Some social scientists theorize that youth act in accordance 
 
74 See Vicki Godal supra note 1 (Malibu youth afraid to come forth as witnesses, even with reward offered, 
and only speak to newspaper reporter off the record). 
75 See American Academy of Pediatrics Report supra note 46; See also,  Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, The Growth of Youth Gang Problems in the United States: 1970-98 (April 2001) 
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/ojjdprpt_yth_gng_prob_2001/chap7.html ("In recent years, increasing 
consensus has developed in support of the position that media images do have a significant influence, 
particularly on more susceptible youth. In the case of youth gangs, this contention would not be difficult to 
sustain. The lifestyle and subculture of gangs are sufficiently colorful and dramatic to provide a basis for 
well-developed media images." 
76 See, e.g., Hip Hop Style:  What is Cool? at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/infocus/fashion/hiphop.html 
(Hip Hop and gangster style popular among youths in suburbs as well as in urban areas); See also, Jamie 
Tierney supra note 4 (MLO members wearing "gangsta" style Old English script on clothing because it is 
popular).   
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with what they learn by watching television and movies or by hearing in music.77 
However, while some studies indicate some coincidence of violence in media and in the 
real world, a similar amount of scholarship suggests a lack of any causal linkage between 
media and real violence.78 In particular, scholars have suggested that blaming the media 
for gang membership and youth violence functions only as a political scapegoat, enabling 
politicians to divert people's focus from the social issues at the root of problems like 
youth gang membership.79 
This suggestion that underlying social issues represent the true cause of gang 
membership and gang violence highlights the importance of the next factor to be 
discussed—the missing protector factor.80 A style of rap music called "gangsta rap" is 
frequently cited as a source of violent influences on youths.81 Gangsta rap has been 
popularized by Los Angeles rappers who write songs that reflect the violence in areas 
where street gangs are prevalent.82 This music is made predominantly by black artists 
about life in black communities like Compton.83 However, the genre's audience has 
 
77 See American Academy of Pediatrics Report supra note 46 
78 See, e.g., Joanne Savage, Does Viewing Violent Media Really Cause Criminal Violence? A 
Methodological Review, AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 10, 99-128. (2004) ("The question 
addressed here is not whether or not the effect is plausible, but whether the effect has been demonstrated 
convincingly in the scientific literature — and the answer is ‘not so far.’...At this point it must be said, 
however, that there is little evidence in favor of focusing on media violence as a means of remedying our 
violent crime problem.");  
79 Stuart Fischoff, Psychology’s Quixotic Quest For the Media-Violence Connection, Address before the 
Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (August 21, 1999) (transcript available at 
http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/sfischo/violence.html) (questioning methodology and validity of media 
violence studies). 
80 The missing protector factor will be fully discussed in Section III (b) infra. This factor arises as the 
result of youths not being able to rely on their parents in crisis situations and being forced to look to their 
peers, putting them at risk of gang membership. 
81 See American Academy of Pediatrics Report supra note 46 
82 See, e.g., Scott Mervis, What up, gangsta? The hardcore rap of the '90s, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 
February 16, 2004 (Compton –based rap group N.W.A. popularizes "gangsta" rap, saying violent lyrics 
reflect events in their community).  
83 Straight Outta Compton, by NWA (Niggaz With Attitude) is widely regarded as the seminal gangsta rap 
album, purporting to portray life in Compton.  N.W.A., STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON (Priority Records 
1990).   
20
come to consist predominantly of white youths.84 As more white youths began to buy 
these records, record executives increasingly sought to portray the black artists as more 
violent, criminal and rebellious against conservative values.85 This counter-culture 
portrayal of rappers naturally appeals to teenagers, who generally go through stages of 
rebellion in their adolescence.86 
Violent lyrics heard by these impressionable youth more likely result in violent 
behavior when these youth have no source of guidance to provide context for the music.  
One article on this subject contrasted the music of the Rolling Stones87 with that of rapper 
50 Cent.88 Drawing parallels between the rebellious lyrics of both popular artists, te 
author asks, "If obnoxious lyrics lead to violence, then why haven't 100 million Rolling 
Stones fan run amok?"89 The article details the view of Eugene Rivers, a black pastor 
from Boston: 
 [F]or adolescent white males, who make up its biggest audience, gangsta rap is 
 relatively harmless. Like the Rolling Stones, rappers offer rebellion on the cheap - 
 - a low-cost way to give the finger to authority, have an outlaw fantasy life, and 
 drive your parents nuts, without any social consequences. The white kids "go off 
 to college, put on a suit and go to work at Morgan Stanley". But for black kids 
 
84 "[A] young white audience . . . purchases 66% of rap music, according to the Recording Industry 
Association of America."  Norman Kelley, Rhythm Nation: The Political Economy of Black Music, BLACK 
RENAISSANCE/RENAISSANCE NOIRE (Summer 1999).  
85 Sean-Patrick Wilson, Comment, Rap Sheets: The Constitutional and Societal Complications Arising 
From the Use of Rap Lyrics as Evidence at Criminal Trials, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 345, 347-50 (2005). 
86 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpability in Adolescent Crime, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 507, 516 
(1999) (adolescence is stressful point in youth's life marked by emotional struggles).   
87 According to their bio on the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame website, the Rolling Stones lyrics "captured 
the Stones' attitude: an impolite, plainspoken surliness that brought them into disfavor with rock-hating 
elements in the establishment. Of course, that only made the group more appealing to those sons and 
daughters who found themselves estranged from the hypocrisies of the adult world - an element that would 
solidify into an increasingly militant and disenchanted counterculture as the decade wore on."  Rock and 
Roll Hall of Fame, 2006 Inductees, at http://www.rockhall.com/hof/inductee.asp?id=182. 
88 50 Cent is the stage name of rapper Curtis Jackson.  Jackson, a convicted drug dealer, has been shot nine 
times and writes rap lyrics about life on the street.  These lyrics have become the source of controversy.  
"On a taping of The O'Reilly Factor, conservative commentator Bill O'Reilly has urged boycotts against rap 
music. O'Reilly named 50 Cent as a target of his crusade to prevent rappers who promote bad behavior 
from endorsing mainstream merchandise." Wikipedia, at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50_cent. 
89 Margaret Wente, Get Mad, We're Being Had, Gangsta Rap's Really Bad, GLOBE AND MAIL, December 1, 
2005, available at http://www.fradical.com/Rap_contributes_to_Toronto_violence.htm. 
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who grow up without family discipline, a sense of law and order, or alternative 
 role models, gangsta rap "has an absolutely catastrophic effect"90 
Thus, youths with stable family backgrounds may have greater ability to judge gangsta 
rap's violent lyrics in a proper, non-violent context.  Conversely, youths without such 
guidance and stability are more likely to take the violent lyrics literally.   
 Accordingly, media violence, by itself cannot explain gang membership.  Any 
influence it may have on impressionable youth comes as a result of a lack of guidance.  
The next section will address how this lack of guidance—the missing protector factor—
explains not only some youths' poor reaction to violence in media, but also some youths' 
decisions to join gangs in general.   
 
c. Gangs as surrogate family and protection for potential members—the missing 
protector factor. 
 The above discussions of factors in gang membership show that none of those 
popularly held notions constitutes a useful, dispositive factor in determining what causes 
youths to join gangs.  The failure of family and similar support mechanisms—what 
author and gang expert Dan Korem calls the "missing protector factor"—provides the 
most common explanation for youths' choices to join dangerous street gangs.91 Societal 
changes like rising divorce rates, increasing numbers of mothers in the workforce, and 
the failure of public schools to properly educate youth "have posed challenges 
 
90 While Pastor Rivers appears to frame the distinction based on black vs. white, he notes that the main 
difference is an "underclass culture."  The lack of guidance is truly the important factor in the influence of 
the music. Id. 
91 See Michael K. Carlie supra note 43; See, also., Sandra Fu, How to Get a Friend out of a Gang, 
available at http://drdrew.com/Topics/article.asp?id=1302 (teens join gangs because of lack of quality 
attention at home) (Dr. Drew Pinsky, a renowned addiction medicine specialist runs a nightly, nationally-
syndicated radio show called Loveline. He addresses behavioral issues in adolescents, and he posts articles 
on these issues on his website, drdrew.com). 
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particularly for poor families, and also for racial and ethnic minorities. However, no 
segment of our society is immune to the effects of these changes, which have produced a 
growing sense of crisis even among the well-to-do."92 Gangs in both urban and suburban 
settings may provide vulnerable youths with a sense of protection when they cannot rely 
on members of their own families to aid them in crisis situations.93 This is the single 
influential factor that both urban and suburban youths who choose to join gangs typically 
have in common.  When law enforcement officials like the Los Angeles County Sheriff's 
Department in Malibu downplay the emergence of gangs like MLO in communities like 
Malibu they help obscure this very important factor by allowing the focus to remain on 
the other, less reliable factors.  This section will first examine the missing protector factor 
to provide a better understanding of the rationale behind youths' decisions to join gangs 
like MLO.  Next, this section will demonstrate the importance of devoting proper 
attention to this factor as society tries to prevent youth gang membership. 
 
1. The missing protector factor as a motivator for youth gang membership. 
 In Suburban Gangs: The Affluent Rebels, author Dan Korem explores the 
evolution of gangs in suburban neighborhoods.94 Korem notes the absence, in those 
areas, of the aforementioned factors normally thought to cause gang membership.95 As 
such, the missing protector factor becomes the critical factor in youths' decisions to join 
suburban gangs.  The missing protector factor arises due to the absence of one or more 
 
92 See Michael K. Carlie supra note 43 (quoting National Science Foundation, Fostering Successful 
Families: The Nature of the Problem, at http://www.nsf.gov, last updated May 21, 2001. Not found on the 
Internet as of April, 2005). 
93 See KOREM, supra note 47, at 63. 
94 See KOREM, supra note 47. 
95 Id. at 6-10. 
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stable parental figures in youths' lives.96 In stable, "nuclear family" situations, where 
both parents are constructively involved in their children's upbringing, youths are far less 
likely to join gangs because they have responsible adults on whom they can rely to 
protect them in crises.97 Conversely, children without the benefit of having both parents 
constructively involved in their upbringing cannot rely on their parents in crisis 
situations.98 This lack of reliable protectors acts to push youths into gang membership 
because they lack the important protector figure normally provided by their parents.  
Consequently, youths must turn to outsiders for such protection and guidance.99 
Korem writes of a study in which children point to protection influences in their 
lives.  Children first look to parents.  Next, they look to other adult authority figures like 
teachers.  If the children do not get the protection they seek from either of those two adult 
sources, they are forced to turn to their peers.100 Although the influence of gangs is 
largely destructive rather than constructive, gangs may appear to provide youths with the 
missing protection through strength in numbers, as evidenced by gangs' early roles as 
protectors of their communities.101 
This missing protector factor and its potential for pushing youths into gangs has 
been endorsed by Los Angeles gang intervention expert Father Greg Boyle.102 Father 
Boyle is notable for his twenty years of work in the Boyle Heights area of East Los 
 
96 The traditional family consists of the "nuclear family" which consists of a functional unit of a mother, a 
father and their children.  Id. at 53. 
97 Id. at 65 (approximately 75% of youths in gangs claimed this factor was present). 
98 This missing protector can arise in the form of one or both of the parents being physically absent during 
the upbringing.  It may also arise if one or both of the parents is dysfunctional.  The type of dysfunction 
involved includes drug or alcohol addiction or mental or physical abuse by the parent.  Id. at 50. 
99 Id. at 65. 
100 Id. 
101 See section III (b) (iii) supra.
102 E-mail from Father Gregory J. Boyle, Jesuit Priest/Founder, Jobs For a Future Homeboy Industries, to 
Brian W. Ludeke, (Apr. 14, 2006, 18:09 PST) (on file with author). 
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Angeles, assisting youths in avoiding gangs.103 Father Boyle opined on Korem's missing 
protector factor:  "Hmmm--missing protective factor--I like it.  In the end a hopeful kid 
never joins a gang--and always a kid is not seeking anything when he joins a gang--he's 
fleeing something.  The pull factor is not significant--the push factor is."104 Youths do 
not decide to join gangs hoping for good things to happen as a result of those decisions.  
Rather, Father Boyle emphasizes the concept of flight from bad situations into gang life, 
which is consistent with the concept of the missing protector factor.  Abuse or neglect in 
youths' home situations acts to deprive youths of the hope that parental guidance usually 
provides.  This lack of hope then pushes the youths out of those dysfunctional situations.  
As a result, gangs become increasingly likely to become the youths' default surrogate 
families.  Avoiding this need for gangs as surrogate families is what Father Boyle has 
addressed in his often successful efforts to provide young gang members with an 
alternative form of support.105 
Professor Jeffrey Fagan discusses this tremendous potential for gang influence on 
impressionable youths in his article concerning the cultural context in which teen 
violence arises.106 Adolescence is a stressful point in youths' lives, and adolescent crime 
is closely linked to the developmental needs of adolescents.107 One of these needs is the 
adolescent's search for an identity.108 In this search for identity, youths often engage in 
rough-housing behavior, learning their way around physical violence.  When these youths 
 
103 See Carol Ann Morrow supra note 67. 
104 See Father Boyle E-mail supra note 102. 
105 Since 1992, Father Boyle has run a non-profit business called Homeboy Industries.  The business 
focuses on providing youths a way out of gangs by providing jobs, counseling and gang tattoo removal.  
Most importantly, Father Boyle says Homeboy Industries represents a "bastion of unconditional love."  
Edward Iwata, Homeboy Industries Goes Gang Busters, USA TODAY, Jul, 10, 2005 available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/smallbusiness/2005-07-10-homeboy-usat_x.htm. 
106 See Fagan supra note 86. 
107 Id. at 516. 
108 Id. at 524. 
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engage in what may begin as mildly violent behavior, the social context in which they act 
becomes crucial.109 
Fagan describes this context in terms of two types of normative systems—
"decent" and "street."110 "Decent" refers to situations in which youths have stable family 
backgrounds that provide them with a healthy frame of reference with which to judge 
events in their lives.  "Street", on the other hand, refers to youths who lack a stable family 
influence and, instead, rely on youths from similarly unstable backgrounds to frame their 
perspectives of the world around them.111 Even in poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods, the 
majority of adolescents fall within the "decent" class.  However, pressures encountered 
on the street, without positive influences, may steer even "decent" adolescents toward 
becoming "street."112 
Other scholars have supported this idea of youths' delinquent, "street" peers acting 
as strong negative influences in the absence of "decent" parenting.  Professor Irving 
Spergel described this influence as follows: 
 [T]he family and the gang may play complementary socialization roles for 
 gang members, teaching them different survival skills.  [The gang is] 
 complementary to the family in lower-class Mexican-American barrio culture in 
 Los Angeles:  the women perform dominant roles in the home and the men 
 perform their warrior roles on the street.113 
Additionally, scholars have advanced an "interactional theory" that cites the influences of 
social structure on youths' delinquent behavior.  A key element of this theory is the idea 
 
109 Id. at 518-19. 
110 Id. at 528. 
111 Id.
112 Id. 535-38. 
113 IRVING A. SPERGEL, THE YOUTH GANG PROBLEM: A COMMUNITY APPROACH 115 (Oxford University 
Press) (1995). 
26
that the influences and subsequent interactions have a bi-directional causality. 114 In 
other words, it assumes not only that anti-social influences like dysfunctional family 
influence youths' selection of peer groups, but also that these peer groups may influence 
delinquent behavior.  
 These scholars' concepts support Fagan's idea that youths from both "decent" and 
"street" backgrounds learn to react to stressful situations in their environments by 
developing scripts through social interaction and practice.  These scripts are consistent 
methods with which to react to those stressful situations.115 "Street" youths learn "street" 
scripts—reactions to stressful situations influenced only by other "street" youths.  These 
scripts often involve the use of violence to resolve the stressful situations.116 "Decent" 
youths, on the other hand, have the positive influences of stable families and can develop 
alternative, "decent" scripts.  These adolescents are, thus, not limited to reacting to stress 
violently like their "street" counterparts.117 
Youths make these behavioral decisions based on interactions with both family 
and peers.  Thus, without a good frame of reference, gang activity in an adolescent's 
environment can serve as a powerful factor in youths' decisions to engage in violent 
behavior.118 Street gangs accept and often encourage violence, and youths may gain 
status by engaging in violent acts in front of the audience that a gang context can 
provide.119 Impressionable youths without the expanded context that a good upbringing 
provides are amenable to the influence of an audience in their decision-making process.  
 
114 TERENCE P. THORNBERRY, ET. AL, GANGS AND DELINQUENCY IN DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 83 
(Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington, eds., Cambridge University Press) (2003). 
115 See Fagan supra note 86 at 535-38.  
116 Id.




A stressful situation may become violent if a youth seeks to gain status by acting violent 
in front of peers who he feels may be impressed by this behavior.  By contrast, the added 
context provided by a "decent" upbringing can provide the youth with alternatives at 
gaining status, avoiding the perceived need for violence in a stressful situation. 
 The missing protector factor is important, as stable protectors are an essential part 
of a "decent" upbringing, providing youth with protection and guidance.  As shown, 
adequate protection provides adolescents with the frame of reference needed to address 
stressful social situations.  Without responsible adults—ideally both functional parents—
to provide this protection, adolescents are at risk of becoming "street" youths, susceptible 
to the destructive influence of street gangs.  The next section will discuss how this push 
toward "street" youths can occur in both urban and suburban settings. 
 
2. The missing protector factor exists in both urban and suburban areas. 
 The push out of the "nuclear family" into the surrogate gang family occurs not 
only in poorer neighborhoods like East Los Angeles, where Father Boyle works, but also 
in neighborhoods like Malibu.  A dysfunctional family and the accompanying lack of 
support and guidance may exacerbate factors such as poverty and the institutionalization 
of gangs in poorer neighborhoods.  Youths with chaotic family situations may lack the 
guidance needed to cope with the pressure from these other factors. However, since 
suburban youths do not face the same types of pressures as youths in poorer urban 
neighborhoods, the missing protector factor remains the one factor that pushes both urban 
and suburban youths to join gangs.  Divorce rates have boomed in America in the last 5 
decades, seeming to show a tacit acceptance of divorce by a large segment of American 
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society.120 This increasing tolerance leaves an ever-increasing number of American 
youth without the steady influence and protection of both parents.121 
In addition to this increasing number of youths who grow up in homes without 
both parents, youths increasingly lack alternative protectors like teachers and coaches, 
who youths could otherwise rely on as potential substitutes for missing parents.122 
School systems, particularly in California, have suffered budget shortfalls that hurt their 
ability to hire teachers and run extra-curricular programs.123 This shortage of teachers 
and after-school programs makes it less likely that students without stable families can 
turn to teachers or other adults for the protection their parents fail to provide.  
Subsequently, youths must look to their peers as role models.  This situation, as noted in 
Section III(b)(1), may have disastrous results when youths who are similarly deprived of 
"decent" upbringings serve as frames of reference for each other's behavior.  The 
following section discusses these sorts of results with respect to an alleged member of 
MLO. 
 
3. Brawley Nolte:  Pushed into MLO by missing protector factor? 
 The impact of the missing protector factor in the decisions of youths to join gangs 
is illustrated by an alleged MLO member named Brawley King Nolte (Nolte).  Nolte 
 
120 In the United States, in 2003 there were 7.5 new marriages per 1000 people and 3.8 divorces per 1000.  
Wikipedia, at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divorce; See also, Michael K. Carlie supra note 43. (Rising 
divorce rate partially responsible for youths'  decisions to join gangs). 
121 Although divorce is cited as a prominent factor for the absence of a protector in a youth's life, other 
factors may remove a parent from the role of protector in a child's life.  See, e.g., KOREM, supra note 47, at 
55 ("A family may appear to be mentally healthy to an outsider, but if even one parent is severely 
dysfunctional and a youth takes the brunt of that dysfunction—it can be the activating mechanism that 
initiates gang involvement."); See also, Carlie supra note 43 (in addition to divorce, presence of mothers in 
the workforce increasing gang membership). 
122 See KOREM, supra note 47, at 65. 
123 Kim Saito, California Universities and Public Schools Face Massive Budget Cuts, WORLD SOCIALIST 
WEB SITE, Jan. 15 2003, available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jan2003/cali-j15.shtml. 
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provides an excellent example of the protector-lacking youth about which Korem writes.  
Nolte is one of the MLO members accused, in a pending civil suit, of attacking the young 
man who was nearly beaten to death.124 Brawley Nolte, an actor himself, is the son of 
actor Nick Nolte.125 This connection to his famous father has made Nolte the face of 
MLO in several media accounts of the gang and its actions.126 
Assuming the allegations are true, Nolte's behavior conforms to traditional 
notions of gang behavior.  He took part in his gang's violent, random attacks and 
intimidation of witnesses.127 However, Nolte does not fit in with many of the traditional 
notions of what causes youths to join urban gangs.  Nolte lived with his father in the 
affluent community of Malibu, attending Malibu High School.  Additionally, Nolte 
allegedly attacked the young man at the party without provocation, at someone else's 
house.128 Thus, Nolte would not have joined MLO because he lived in the type of 
poverty experienced by some youths who join urban gangs nor because he was protecting 
any sort of property rights or ethnic interests.   
 Since these traditional factors cannot explain someone like Brawley Nolte's 
decision to join a gang, the missing protector factor may become particularly relevant in 
accounting for the decision.  Nick Nolte is divorced from Brawley's mother, so Brawley 
 
124 Although Nolte was not charged in the beating reports alleged that he was involved in the beating.  
"Brawley Nolte has been identified as the member of new gang Malibu Locals Only, who gatecrash posh 
parties and beat up non Malibu kids.  And now the 17-year-old . . . has been named in a lawsuit by one 
youngster who claims Brawley and his gang mates "struck, hit, kicked, beat, assaulted and battered" him at 
a party."  Nick Nolte's Son in Trouble, Contact Music, Apr. 4, 2004 at 
http://www.contactmusic.com/new/xmlfeed.nsf/mndwebpages/nick%20nolte.s%20son%20in%20trouble; 
The suit was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court in Santa Monica but was transferred to a Malibu court.  
The outcome is still pending.   Suit details available at 
http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilCaseSummary/index.asp?CaseType=Civil. 
125 Brawley Nolte starred opposite Mel Gibson in the Ron Howard film Ransom.  IMDB, Brawley Nolte, at 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0634509/; Nick Nolte has starred in over 65 films.  He received two 
Academy Award nominations.  IMDB, Nick Nolte, at http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000560/ 
126 See Craig Stephens supra note 1. 
127 See Vicki Godal supra note 1. 
128 Id. 
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lacked the protection provided by both parents' involvement in his upbringing.129 
Furthermore, Nick Nolte has publicly struggled with substance abuse problems, thus 
seeming to fit the description of a dysfunctional parent.130 With this lack of a stable 
family situation, Brawley Nolte appears to typify the at-risk suburban youth who is 
pushed to look to peers to fulfill the role of protector and provide the social context with 
which to develop his behavior.131 
If this push occurred as described, Nolte may have found this sort of protection 
and support from MLO.  Unfortunately, like many "street" youth who lack parental 
guidance, as described above in Section III (b) (1), Nolte's support and protection may 
have come in the form of MLO.  MLO's leader is apparently a man who the 
aforementioned founding MLO member would only fictitiously identify as "Ricco."  
 [The leader of MLO] is an Arab/Persian . . .  In between prison for drug  and 
other charges he lives with his wealthy Arab parents [in Malibu].  He has  some "cool" 
prison tats (Shitty ink).  Although I remember him (my opinion) as a useless bitch that 
couldn't surf for chit, rumor has it he learned to fight a little in Prison. Little rich actors 
kids parents are often too busy to even sort of do their job so they are left to be raised by 
MTV/RAP videos. A head full of gangster rap/culture and "Ricco" for a mentor.132 
With such a lack of adequate parental guidance, a youth like Nolte may have been led 
astray by other powerful social influences.  With his prison tattoos and apparently self-
adopted tough guy image, "Ricco" could conceivably convey the image of someone who 
 
129 Nick Nolte divorced Brawley's mother, Rebecca Linger, in 1991 when Brawley was 5 years old.  Nick 
Nolte, Yahoo Movies, available at http://movies.yahoo.com/movie/contributor/1800011534/bio. 
130 See, e.g., Nick Nolte in DUI Arrest, CBS News, at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/23/entertainment/main522969.shtml (Nick Nolte cited in 2002 
for driving while under the influence of the powerful depressant GHB—also known popularly as the date 
rape drug). 
131 Brawley Nolte continued to commit delinquent acts as of April 2005, when he was arrested in West 
Virginia for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.   Associated Press, Nick Nolte's Son Faces 
Felony Pot Charge, ABC News, Apr. 25, 2005, at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/wireStory?id=701365. 
132 See MLO Founder Email supra note 13 
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could provide the protection that an impressionable youth like Nolte may have lacked in 
his biological family.133 
Due to this type of powerful influence that gangs may provide to vulnerable 
youths like Nolte, the importance of a stable family environment is crucial.  However, the 
stable nuclear family is becoming more and more a thing of the past.  Additionally, gang 
membership appears to be on the rise, spreading throughout America.134 Thus, the 
missing protector factor becomes the most important factor for society to address in its 
efforts to stop youths from joining gangs. 
 
X. Challenges in the War on Gangs and how failure to properly address MLO hurts the 
war on gangs.   
 Due to the rise in gang membership, the failure of authorities like the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff's Department to properly identify a gang like MLO increases the 
challenges faced by the criminal justice system in the fight against gang violence.  First, 
gangs and the violence that they bring to their communities have become a matter of 
global concern.135 Malibu officials' failure to properly address MLO as a gang allows 
such a potentially dangerous gang to exist and grow without any impediment.  Second, 
because of the prevalence of gang violence, the criminal justice system has adopted 
powerful, though constitutionally suspect, tools like civil gang injunctions and the STEP 
Act in its war against youth gangs.  If authorities fail to classify suburban gangs like 
 
133 This is particularly true in light of today's youths apparent fascination with gang culture.  Gangster rap 
dominates the hip hop market, and its customers are white youths at whom the record companies market 
the most violent gangster material possible.  See section III supra. 
134 See, e.g., KOREM, supra note 47 (gangs spreading from inner city to affluent suburbs). 
135 See, e.g., TEEN GANGS supra note 12 (discusses gang problems in such diverse places as Australia, the 
Bahamas, Great Britain, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Puerto 
Rico, Taiwan, and Trinidad and Tobago). 
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MLO as gangs when they appear to meet statutory definitions of gangs, the war on gangs 
begins to appear arbitrary.  This arbitrary enforcement raises Equal Protection questions 
by placing a seemingly heavier burden on the constitutional rights of minorities.  Thus, it 
appears to harm the legitimacy of anti-gang measures and seems to perpetuate the 
appearance of inherent racism in the criminal justice system. 
 
a. Gangs are a problem of epidemic proportions, particularly in Los Angeles County. 
 Gangs have become prevalent worldwide.136 Los Angeles, in particular, has one 
of the worst gang problems in the country.137 In Los Angeles County, law enforcement 
officials know of more than 1300 street gangs with over 150,000 members. The City of 
Los Angeles alone, has roughly 407 gangs and over 56,000 members.138 These numbers 
represent a dramatic rise in the last two decades.  In 1989, Los Angeles prosecutors noted 
that the city had over 700 street gangs and 70,000 gang members.139 Furthermore, gangs 
have spread from the inner-city to suburban areas in Los Angeles and nationwide.140 
With such a dramatic, recent increase, the criminal justice system must aggressively fight 
gangs, not only in the inner-city, but also in the suburbs.  As such, a gang like MLO 
should present a concern to law enforcement officials. 
 
136 Id. 
137 "'As goes L.A., so goes the rest of the country,' says Ron Stallworth, a former gang-intelligence 
coordinator for the state of Utah."  Terry McCarthy, L.A. Gangs are Back, TIME, 2001, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/photoessays/gangs/story.html. 
138 Violence Prevention Coalition of Greater Los Angeles, Fact Sheets, at 
http://www.vpcla.org/factGang.htm 
139 Ira Reiner, Taking on Street Gangs: A Plan for Prosecutors, PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF, at 5 (Fall 1989). 
140 See KOREM, supra note 47. 
33
i. Why MLO and suburban gangs constitute a particular danger.   
 This spreading gang threat has become apparent in Malibu.  The evolution of 
MLO from its early form to its modern incarnation, as discussed in Section II, shows it 
now has much in common with the gangs in Compton and East Los Angeles.  Los 
Angeles Sheriff's officials should label them as such and address the problem before 
MLO creates worse problems for Malibu.  A gang like MLO, left unchecked, could 
create problems for Malibu in two ways.  First, less established gangs and gang members 
can be even more dangerous than established gangs, as these "wannabe" gangsters may 
feel the need to appear dangerous like their more established counterparts.  Second, if a 
gang like MLO is allowed to grow without intervention by law enforcement officials, the 
gang can become institutionalized in the community, creating a more deep-seeded 
problem for law enforcement officials in the future.   
 
1. The danger of "wannabes" 
 While gangs like those found in areas like Compton and East Los Angeles are 
well-known and feared in their communities, members of less-established gangs like 
MLO may feel pressure to live up to the images of their more established counterparts.  
These less-established gang members are often referred to as "wannabe's."141 
"Wannabe's'" need to make names for themselves may lead them to commit worse, more 
 
141 "Wannabe" is a shortened version of "want to be."  "Real gang members will even tell you that the most 
dangerous juvenile is one who is 'false flagging' [synonym for wannabe].  A juvenile who wants to be in a 
gang will often go to extremes to prove that he is 'down.'  As a result he may be more prone to violence."  
Gang Intelligence/ Threat Management Group, The Wannabe Lie, posted Apr. 9, 2006, available at 
http://violencemanagement.blogspot.com/2006/04/wannabe-lie.html. 
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random crimes than those committed by established gangs, whose existing reputation 
makes it unnecessary to act violently solely out of a desire to create a reputation.142 
MLO seems to have exhibited this type of "wannabe" behavior in the attacks 
described in the Foreword section.  When the idea of an active gang in Malibu is 
mentioned those unfamiliar with MLO, the common reaction is derision—the idea that a 
Malibu gangster has to be a ridiculous "wannabe" of the worst kind.143 This lack of 
respect represents the type of stimulus that may create "wannabe" violence. The random, 
ultra-violent attack on the non-Malibu resident at the Malibu party would seem to be 
consistent with the idea of excessive "wannabe" violence—MLO and its members 
wanting to create an intimidating reputation for themselves.   
 Unfortunately, Los Angeles Sheriff's officials have treated this dangerous 
behavior in a dismissive manner.144 The incident, though investigated, never resulted in 
the filing of criminal charges.145 In newspaper articles, Los Angeles Sheriff's Detective 
J.T. Manwell stated that MLO was not a gang.  Deputy Vic Paladino made the same 
statement at a Malibu town meeting.146 As such, Sheriff's officials appear to fail to 




143 See Jamie Tierney supra note 4 (article title, "Malibu's Least Wanted," is a parody of the title of a 2003 
film about a wannabe Malibu gangster. 
144 See Vicki Godal supra note 1. 
145 Id. 
146 See Malibu Town Meeting Minutes supra note 8. 
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ii. The danger of institutionalization. 
 In addition to ignoring this "wannabe" danger, law enforcement officials' failure 
to address MLO as a gang creates the danger that MLO will take root in Malibu, 
becoming an inescapable feature of the community like the gangs of East Los Angeles.  
This danger of institutionalization should concern a suburban community like Malibu 
because gangs are particularly difficult to fight when they become well-established.147 
Furthermore, it is difficult to disengage a youth from such an established gang.148 
Typically, youths may belong to a non-institutionalized youth group or gang for a 
period of time but become less interested when other opportunities like college arise.149 
This assumption may come into play in the public's seeming lack of concern with respect 
to MLO.  It is possible that society sees a gang like MLO in an affluent community and 
assumes that, because of their wealth and mobility, MLO members will simply choose to 
leave the lifestyle when they tire of it.  This idea seems to have been adopted even by 
people somewhat familiar with the gang like the aforementioned MLO founder, who 
discounts modern MLO members as "[l]ittle rich 
actors kids parents [sic]."150 Unfortunately, the continuing presence of MLO in Malibu 
and the violent behavior the gang exhibits seem to belie this notion that the gang will just 
go away if ignored.  If law enforcement officials allow a gang like MLO to become part 
of the fabric of the community, those opportunities may begin to seem less attractive than 
life in an established gang.   
 
147 See KOREM, supra note 47, at 68. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 206. 
150 See MLO Founder Email supra note 13. 
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The possibility of such institutionalization has already become evident in MLO's 
evolution.  As discussed in Section II, supra, MLO began as a loose association of surfers 
that protected themselves and their private beaches.  The gang's role as protectors of the 
Malibu community and beaches disappeared when Malibu beaches became public and 
Malibu got its own high school.  Many early MLO members like the aforementioned 
founder simply moved on to other opportunities like their careers.  "Fast forward to 
today's MLO,"151 and one sees a gang that has already shown a willingness to increase its 
pattern of violent behavior to a level that meets the STEP Act's criteria for defining a 
gang.   
 Because of its increasing level of violence and intimidation of witnesses, MLO 
has begun to establish itself as a group that inspires fear in its own community.  
Furthermore, members of the gang aren't simply leaving the gang when it comes time to 
attend college.152 MLO appears to be in the process of institutionalization.  
Unfortunately, not all members of the community, including law enforcement officials 
appear concerned at this development.153 Los Angeles Sheriff's officials' failure to 
address this issue, thus, creates the risk that MLO will become entrenched in the Malibu 
community and will become increasingly difficult to fight in the future.  Because of this 
institutionalization concern and the dangers posed by gangs—both "wannabe" and 
established—the criminal justice system has adopted powerful tools, to be discussed in 
the next section, in its war on gangs. 
 
151 See MLO Founder Email supra note 13 
152 See Jamie Tierney supra note 4 (most MLO are "guys who work at Subway"). 
153 See, e.g., Craig Stephens supra note 1 (Malibu business owner John Jacobs calls the attention to MLO in 
the media overblown hype over youths doing "normal things, they surf, drink beer, chase girls and fight, 
they don't sit at home studying the piano."); But see Id. (Another Malibu business owner and parent of three 
children, named only as Jay, has strong feelings about MLO and their cost to the community due to their 
repeated vandalism of area schools). 
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b. Tools used by law enforcement in the war on gangs. 
 Because of the growing problem of gangs and the concern that they are becoming 
institutionalized in communities throughout the state, California has created tools to assist 
law the criminal justice system in aggressively fighting gangs and gang violence.  These 
tools include the STEP Act and civil gang injunctions.  The STEP Act allows law 
enforcement officials to criminalize the mere act of participating in activities that may 
benefit gangs.154 Additionally, Los Angeles law enforcement officials can seek civil 
gang injunctions, using nuisance law, to prevent gang members from otherwise legal acts 
like assembling together in public.155 
Criminal justice officials consider these tools effective and have used them 
extensively in attacking dangerous street gangs.156 However, critics of the STEP Act and 
anti-gang injunctions have questioned their impact on constitutional rights such as 
freedom of association.157 This questionable constitutionality, when coupled with the 
potential for arbitrary enforcement, creates two grave concerns.  First, arbitrary 
enforcement, like the refusal to use STEP Act enforcement or injunctions against a 
suburban, white gang, creates the concern that minorities are being singled out for 
harsher treatment under the criminal justice system's anti-gang tools, violating the Equal 
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.158 Second, such arbitrary enforcement, 
if done in a seemingly invidiously discriminatory manner, harms the efforts of the 
criminal justice system by perpetuating the appearance of racism in the system. 
 
154 Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22. 
155 See Jeffrey Grogger supra note 36. 
156 See Los Angeles Civil Grand Jury Report supra note 30. 
157 See, e.g., Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Enjoining the Constitution:  The Use of Public Nuisance 
Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, Note, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 428-29 (1999) (injunction 
defendants have civil liberties curtailed simply for associating with people who have committed crimes). 
158 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §1. 
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1. Law Enforcement officials must utilize the STEP Act and civil gang 
injunctions uniformly to avoid equal protection violations. 
 In 1988, the California legislature enacted California Criminal Code § 186.22, 
known as the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, or the STEP Act.  The 
STEP Act allows for harsh penalties applied to gang members for gang-related crimes.159 
Importantly, the STEP Act provides criteria that a group must meet to constitute a gang 
and fall under its purview.  The Act requires that the group be an association of people 
with a common insignia or identifier that associates with the purpose of committing 
predicate acts as set forth in that statute.160 Additionally, beginning in the early 1990's, 
Los Angeles County law enforcement agencies began pursuing civil injunctions against 
gangs that they classified as public nuisances.  As previously noted, these civil gang 
injunctions allow law enforcement agencies to seek court orders enjoining gang members 
from associating together in public.161 If violated, the injunctions are enforceable through 
harsh contempt of court penalties.162 Both the STEP Act and civil injunctions have been 
considered successful in providing California law enforcement officials with the ability to 
target gangs for strict law enforcement action.163 
Although these tools would be valuable in fighting a suburban gang like MLO, 
the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department has repeatedly refused to label MLO as a gang.  
Despite these denials, MLO meets the STEP Act's criteria to be considered a gang.  The 
attacks, as described in the Foreword, show that MLO numbers more than the three 
 
159 Cal. Pen. Code §186.22. 
160 Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22. 
161 See Los Angeles Civil Grand Jury Report supra note 30. 
162 See, e.g., Jeffrey Grogger supra note 36 at 72 ("Once an injunction is imposed, prosecutors can pursue 
violations of the injunction in either civil or criminal court. The maximum penalty for civil contempt is a 
$1,000 fine and 5 days in jail. The maximum penalty under criminal prosecution is a $1,000 fine and 6 
months in jail."). 
163 See Los Angeles Civil Grand Jury Report supra note 30;  See also Jeffrey Grogger supra note 36. 
39
required by the statute.164 MLO members committed predicate acts under California 
Penal Code § 186.22 when they performed an assault with a deadly weapon or an assault 
with great bodily force, using the dangerous MagLite in the attack, and they subsequently 
threatened witnesses with death.165 The gang has a common insignia and identifier, as 
they self-identify with MLO and frequently spray-paint graffiti with the MLO identifier 
in areas around Malibu.166 Thus, according to the STEP Act criteria, MLO constitutes a 
gang. As such, Los Angeles law enforcement officials could prosecute MLO members 
using the STEP Act or could seek a civil gang injunction against MLO.  However, it 
appears that the officials have simply chosen not to. 
 This failure by Los Angeles Sheriff's Department officials to attack MLO as a 
gang raises the question of why such a decision is being made.  There is no outward 
indication that officials have made such a decision based on the fact that MLO members 
are primarily white.167 However, the fact that a predominantly white suburban gang can 
escape the close scrutiny of law enforcement officials raises the possibility of arbitrary 
enforcement when STEP Act prosecutions and civil gang injunctions are regularly sought 
by police and upheld by courts with respect to primarily minority gangs.168 
164 See Vicki Godal supra note 1. 
165 Id. 
166 Id.; See also, Jamie Tierney supra note 4 (MLO members wear T-shirts with MLO in Gothic print, 
similar to clothing seen on Hispanic gang members); See also Craig Stephens supra note 1 (MLO members 
"have their own clothing and jewelry designed by Bill Wall jewelry. These are insignia fighting rings they 
combine in sets of four to use as brass knuckles in fights. The gang also have various t-shirts and hats with 
the initials MLO printed in gothic text."). 
167 There are some logical reasons officials might not want to acknowledge MLO as a gang.  Sheriff's 
officials may need to make selective allocation of scarce law enforcement resources.  Sheriff's officials may 
not want to encourage these youths by providing infamy in their reports to the media.  Additionally, they 
might feel pressure from Malibu residents to provide a sort of NIMBY response—Malibu residents may not 
want to acknowledge the presence of gangs in their backyards.  Unfortunately, Sheriff's Department 
officials have not articulated any of these reasons for their decision not to pursue MLO as a gang. 
168 See e.g., Jeffrey Grogger supra note 36 ("In Los Angeles County, 22 injunctions have been imposed 
since 1993; 12 have been imposed since 1997."). 
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution forbids states from enacting laws that place a greater burden on minorities or 
from enforcing facially neutral laws such that minorities bear a greater burden under 
those laws.169 Such invidious discrimination will not stand without the state 
demonstrating a compelling interest in making such a distinction and proving that the 
interest is being advanced in the least discriminatory manner possible.170 A pattern of 
discriminatory use of the STEP Act and civil gang injunctions could demonstrate an 
invidious purpose behind the laws, which would constitute a Fourteenth Amendment 
violation.171 If the STEP Act and civil gang injunctions are to remain legitimate tools in 
combating gang violence, California law enforcement officials must ensure that such 
decisions are not being made arbitrarily or discriminatorily so that minorities do not bear 
a disproportionate share of the burden of those laws.   
 
2. Uniform enforcement of the STEP Act and civil gang injunctions is especially 
important in light of racial concerns in the criminal justice system. 
 The possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of laws like the STEP 
Act and civil gang injunctions highlights the inherent part that race is sometimes thought 
to play in the criminal justice system.  Minorities, particularly African-Americans, come 
into contact with law enforcement officials far more often, with respect to their 
proportion of the population, than do whites.  "About 40% of U.S. prisoners are black.  If 
 
169 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 609 (1985) (prosecutorial discretion, though broad, 
limited by constitutional concerns like racial disparity). 
170 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
171 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (facially neutral law can violate 14th Amendment if used in 
invidious manner). 
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incarceration trends continue, 1 in 3 black males today will do time in state prison."172 
Furthermore, "racial disparities in incarceration likely reflect differential enforcement.  
Police officers are more likely to stop African Americans for traffic stops and, once 
stopped, they are more likely to search the vehicles of African Americans."173 
Interestingly, this high rate of incarceration only serves to exacerbate the missing 
protector factor that causes such high rates of gang membership.  "By removing so many 
black men from the community and stigmatizing them forever with a criminal conviction, 
criminal law enforcement is likely to mean more single-parent families [and] less adult 
supervision of children. . . "174 
This racial disparity also plays a part in law enforcement efforts at stopping 
gangs.  A database used by the Los Angeles District Attorney "listed over 37000 Black 
gang members and over 58000 Hispanic gang members . . . However, White gang 
members were so scarce that they did not even warrant their own category . . . "175 These 
figures do not match a survey in which youths self-reported their gang membership.  
"[A]n average of 2.8% of Blacks, 2.8% of Hispanics and 1.3% of Whites responded that 
they had belonged to a gang . . . "176 If one considers those numbers with respect to the 
proportions in the population that those ethnic groups represent, white gang members 
would exceed the number of Black and Hispanic gang members, combined.177 
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This overestimation of minorities' roles in gangs becomes a problem if it results in 
law enforcement officials' perception that gangs are only a problem in poor, minority 
communities.  This perception can create aggressive policing in poor areas and pervasive 
stops of minority youths.178 Professors Linda Beres and Thomas Griffith illustrated this 
troubling possibility in their discussion of the police treatment of Dylan Klebold and Eric 
Harris, the Columbine murderers.  Klebold and Harris belonged to a group called the 
Trenchcoat Mafia, and this group met the relevant criteria to be labeled as a gang.179 
However, the media and police rarely referred to the Trenchcoat Mafia as a gang.180 As 
such, Beres and Griffith noted the appearance of a double standard: 
Imagine that African American or Latino youth formed a group that wore black 
trench coats and combat boots in school, roamed the halls in groups, called itself a 
"mafia", and included members who espoused a hatred of other races and had a 
predilection for making bombs.  It is inconceivable that such a group would be 
classified as a clique, club or social circle instead of a gang.  It seems equally clear 
that if two members of this group shot fellow students and planted bombs at the 
school, the crimes would be classified as gang-related . . . 181 
Having the crimes classified as gang-related would result in the other gang members 
faced with the possibility that their association with each other could be enjoined under 
the STEP Act if they lived in California.   
 Like the Columbine killers, MLO is a predominantly white suburban gang.182 If 
the aforementioned 2004 party assault had been performed by a group of minority youths 
who used a gang name and who had threatened and intimidated witnesses, it is hard to 
imagine that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department would not have labeled the 
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attack as gang-related.  Thus, the double standard of which Beres and Griffith wrote 
appears to have come into play in the decision not to call MLO a gang. 
 This apparent double standard presents further concerns when it arises within the 
context of the STEP Act and civil gang injunctions.  As previously noted, these tools 
have been criticized for their infringement on alleged gang members' civil rights.183 
"Through the magic of a judicial order, even purely social association becomes a 
punishable offence, subjecting violators to months of incarceration and significant 
fines."184 Critics of anti-gang injunctions have likened them to the Black Codes and 
vagrancy laws that were enacted shortly after the emancipation of the slaves in the U.S.185 
These laws stood until the early 1970's, when the Supreme Court announced its 
disapproval of "a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to 'stand on a 
public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer'"186 
Modern anti-gang injunctions do not appear to have arisen from the overt racism 
of the post-Civil War South like the Black Codes and vagrancy statutes.  The text of laws 
like the STEP Act provides for racially neutral application.  However, scholar Gary 
Stewart points out that "despite their lack of overt racial language, these provisions—in 
particular, the restriction on the rights to association and movement—bear an 
uncomfortable resemblance to the postbellum vagrancy laws."187 Stewart describes a 
concept called aversive racism which he finds common among white Americans.  The 
aversive racist may have racially discriminatory ideas.  However, because he knows that 
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these ideas are socially unacceptable, he will mask those ideas while engaged in 
interracial interactions.188 This masking makes aversive racism possibly more dangerous 
than overt racism, as minorities could more easily point out overt discrimination in laws 
than racism masked by facially neutral statutory language.189 
Stewart finds this sort of facial neutrality particularly troublesome in anti-gang 
measures like STEP.  Though not overtly racist, STEP may criminalize non-criminal 
behavior like association and cultural dress.  Minority youths, in particular, may wear 
urban apparel that law enforcement may come to associate with gang membership.  As 
such, regardless whether they are actually gang members, these youths may be 
erroneously labeled gang members due to this stereotype.  "[S]ome minority youths 
might automatically be labeled gang members even though similarly situated—and 
similarly outfitted—white youth would not receive such labels."190 This dangerous 
possibility was realized in People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna, in which members of a Hispanic 
San Jose street gang were enjoined from being seen together in public view.191 One of 
the defendants, Blanca Gonzalez, was named in the injunctive order because she wore 
clothing that fit police claimed was worn by members of the gang.192 "Based on the 
majority's criteria . . . the City would consider a person to be a member of a Sureno gang . 
. . [even though their] wardrobe might reflect the cultural garb of urban minority 
teenagers more generally."193 
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While a minority such as Blanca Gonzales may be classified as a gang member 
simply because of her clothing, white gang members like MLO receive no such scrutiny 
in spite of their violent, gang-like behavior.  MLO members appear to self-identify as a 
gang, using their common identifier and adopting a style of dress similar to their urban 
counterparts.194 On one hand, one might discount MLO's style of dress and apparent self-
designation as a gang as mere "wannabe" behavior.  However, as demonstrated in Ms. 
Gonzalez's case, this sort of imitation, when done by minorities, carries with it vastly 
different consequences.  This type of double standard raises concerns of racism when a 
gang like MLO is not treated like a gang. 
 This double standard ultimately hurts efforts at stopping gangs.  Because the 
STEP Act is written in a racially neutral manner, it can provide prosecutorial officials 
with a legitimate, valuable tool with which to fight gangs.  However, even if one 
disagrees with Stewart's aversive racism arguments, unequal enforcement of laws lends 
credence to such criticisms.  Initially, such unequal enforcement presents concerns of an 
Equal Protection violation.  If minority youths' constitutional rights are burdened more 
than those of whites when there is no compelling reason for such inequity, the STEP Act 
and civil gang injunctions violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  Furthermore, unequal 
enforcement may show the existence of a double standard in the criminal justice system 
and may support race-based criticisms.  
 Because the criminal justice system appears to have embraced this double 
standard by failing to classify MLO as a gang, the criminal justice system has harmed 
efforts at stopping gangs by allowing the appearance of racism in the system.  
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Furthermore, as noted in section III, the failure to call MLO a gang places too much focus 
on stereotypical causes of gang membership, causing officials to ignore the most 
important factor—the missing protector factor.  The next section will propose solutions to 
these important issues.  
 
XI. Proposed solutions based on what MLO illustrates. 
 As noted, both urban and suburban gangs, like MLO, present a growing danger to 
society.195 Society must fight this danger on two levels.  First, society needs to take 
action to stop youths from joining gangs in the first place.  As discussed in Section III(b), 
this entails identifying the missing protector factor as the most relevant factor in youth 
gang membership and taking action to eliminate this factor.  Second, society must ensure 
that the criminal justice system not only has useful tools with which to fight gangs, but 
also that the system uses those tools so that no single group of youths faces a particularly 
heavy burden as a result of that fight.   
 This section will discuss ways in which society can address both of these needs.  
To accomplish the first goal, society needs to attempt to alleviate the missing protector 
factor's influence in both urban and suburban youths' decision-making processes.  To do 
so, society must establish programs to ensure that at-risk youth who lack parental 
protectors have enough alternative sources of protection and guidance available to them 
so that gangs never become their only option.  As to the second goal, the criminal justice 
system must ensure that prosecution of gangs under legislation like the STEP Act and the 
use of civil gang injunctions do not constitute a violation of the Equal Protection clause.  
It can do this either by ensuring that it enforces laws uniformly or by requiring law 
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enforcement officials to clearly articulate and properly justify their decisions to 
selectively prosecute different gangs. 
 
a. Society must address gang membership before it becomes an issue in the criminal 
justice system by providing protection and guidance to youth who lack it. 
 As noted in Section III(b), the missing protector factor provides the most useful 
factor for society to attack in efforts at prevention of gang membership.  This missing 
protector factor is most useful because it arises in both urban and suburban youths' 
decisions to join gangs.  Furthermore, the missing protector factor is one of the few 
factors over which society can realistically exercise some control.  By contrast, in order 
to remove the poverty factor from youths' decision making processes in the area of gang 
membership, the economy of the entire country would have to undergo sweeping changes 
to ensure the kind of redistribution of wealth that would be necessary to cure that poverty.  
America's leaders have attempted and failed to resolve the country's poverty issues 
virtually since the birth of the nation.196 With the nation's historical failure to solve 
problems like poverty, it is not realistic to expect that such factors could provide a 
realistic basis for efforts at stopping youths from deciding to join gangs.   
 Implementing programs in conjunction with schools to provide children with 
viable alternatives to gangs, however, is much more realistic.  Programs such as 
community based interventions with at-risk youths have proven effective, particularly 
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with respect to youths in preschool or early elementary school.197 As such, using these 
types of programs to address the "missing protector factor" provides the most promising 
approach to preventing youths' decisions to join gangs. 
 Researchers have generally shared this opinion.  "According to the Study Group 
on Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders . . . convened by the Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to study the population of SVJ offenders—
implementing family, school, and community interventions is the best way to prevent 
children from developing into [serious, violent juvenile] offenders."198 This study 
examined five different types of school programs aimed at preventing youth delinquency, 
including structured playground activities, behavioral monitoring and reinforcement.199 
"Programs that monitored student behavior and reinforced attendance and academic 
progress increased positive school behavior . . . and decreased delinquency."200 This 
reinforcement of positive behavior is consistent with the concept of providing youths 
with social context as discussed in section III (c) (1), supra.  Children from "decent" 
family backgrounds receive this type of positive reinforcement and develop non-violent 
scripts with which to deal with stressful situations.  These programs ensure that youths, 
even if they lack this type of positive reinforcement in their home environment, will 
receive it from a responsible adult instead of a youth's "street" peers.  Thus, these 
programs may dramatically reduce the likelihood that a youth will be pushed into gang 
life. 
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Scholars like Dan Korem note that this missing protector factor arises when a 
youth cannot count on an immediate family member during a time of crisis.201 Korem 
notes success in gang intervention and prevention when programs directly attack this lack 
of support and protection.  "[D]irectly addressing this factor in the lives of over 400 
Dallas County inner-city youths provided a vaccine against gang enticements over a 
period of six years."202 "[T]he reason 400 Dallas inner-city youths whom I worked with 
resisted gang activity was because we let them know that whenever and wherever they 
needed help, we would be there for them."203 Korem and his co-workers became the 
types of protectors that these youths lacked.  The role of family as protector means that 
the youths know they have someone to count on anytime there's a crisis in their lives.  By 
filling this role that the nuclear family would normally play, Korem's group was able to 
prevent 400 at-risk youths from joining gangs. 
 Other communities across America have achieved success with precisely these 
types of programs.  As noted above, these programs are most effective when targeted at 
youths in elementary school or earlier.204 Gang prevention personnel in Austin noted that 
gang members have excellent leadership qualities if channeled properly.  They 
established the Roving Leader program.  The program "targets youth between the ages of 
9-19 years old at risk of gang involvement or juvenile delinquency . . . The goal of the 
program is to make students aware of the importance of finishing high school, build self-
esteem, motivation, encourage goal-setting, and responsibility. The activities offered by 
the program are: youth support groups, tutoring, parent support group, cooking classes, 
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and recreation. Youths can get support 24 hours a day."205 In California, Orange and San 
Bernardino County officials established the CHOICES Program, which "focuses on 
middle school youths who are at greatest risk and aims to reduce drug use, academic 
failure, gang activities, drop outs, and delinquency . . . Throughout the program, students 
are involved in cooperative learning, problem-solving, role-play, and drama, self and 
cultural awareness, and learning self-control and decision making skills."206 These 
programs show that schools and communities recognize that they can influence youths 
not to join gangs by supplying the missing protector when a youth needs it. 
 This need for surrogate family protection has also been noted by law enforcement 
officials in Orange County California.  Law enforcement officials in Orange County have 
implemented the "8% Solution."207 This program is based on a study of factors that 
promote recidivism in youth offenders.  One of the key factors, according to the study 
was termed the "Family Problem Factor" and arose in situations where parents are 
missing, dysfunctional or abusive.208 Orange County has experienced significant gains in 
reducing recidivism in the youths that fit this criteria by addressing "adequate levels of 
supervision, structure, and support to minors and their families throughout the 
intervention process" and "[d]eveloping strategies that produce educational success, in 
part by assisting families to ensure that their minors attend school regularly."209 By 
focusing on providing youths with proper family support, Orange County officials have 
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shown that they can prevent the type of violence, often gang-related, that has plagued 
cities like Los Angeles.  Cities like Malibu should follow suit by recognizing their gang 
problem and addressing useful avenues like the above programs for fixing their problems. 
 Unfortunately, in spite of the repeated demonstrations of the potential of such 
programs, governments, particularly the California state government, have failed to 
provide schools with the funding needed to implement programs to address the missing 
protector factor.   
"California’s schools, which now rank 38th in the nation in per capita spending, 
will be utterly devastated [by proposed budget cuts] . . .   [E]ven schools in 
wealthier middle class areas have been asked to lay off 25 percent of their 
teaching staff, as well as janitors, gardeners, nursing staff and counselors. There is 
also talk of firing up to 35,000 teachers."210 
Such budget cuts make it impossible for under-staffed schools to provide the sort of 
attention needed by youths who lack such attention at home.  This problem has been 
noted nationwide.  Only 58 percent of schools surveyed by the National Institute of 
Justice offered gang prevention in the form of individual attention.211 If schools are 
incapable of providing the types of program that Korem and like-minded officials have 
successfully used, the missing protector factor cannot be addressed.  This leaves youths 
completely lacking in adults they can count on in a crisis.  Thus, society will continue to 
face the risk that these youths will join gangs. 
 This failure likely comes as the result of society placing too much focus on jailing 
gang members and not enough focus on preventing at-risk youths from becoming gang 
members in the first place.  California, for example, spends increasingly large amounts of 
money to jail prisoners at the expense of its education system.   "California's 2005-2006 
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[prison] $7.4 billion budget is up from its $5.237 billion budget of 2002-2003."212 While 
the prison budget rises, the improvement of educational programs has apparently not 
presented such a concern to California officials.  In particular, critics of California's 
educational spending cite a recent budget shortfall in which education officials agreed to 
a cut based on the promise of prompt repayment when the state was on firmer financial 
ground.  "[F]unding would be reduced for one year by a maximum of $2 billion and the 
expectation that lost funds would be restored if state finances improved. However, 
decisions based on differing interpretations of the agreement and the law led, in effect, to 
a shortfall of $3.8 billion in the education budget."213 Shortfalls like this could be 
avoided if the state focused less on incarcerating criminals and more on educating youth 
so they have alternatives to crime when they finish school.  The aforementioned 2 billion 
dollar increase in the prison budget could address such shortfalls and be used to increase 
the number of the types of aforementioned programs to keep youths out of gangs. 
 Governments like California's demonstrate, in these decisions to forsake 
education in favor of prisons, a lack of foresight that is consistent with the views of many 
of their constituents.  Many American citizens favor a "tough on crime" approach 
primarily because this approach, although costly, provides immediate, tangible results in 
the form of arrests and incarceration of offenders.214 By contrast, programs like the 
aforementioned educational programs, though shown to be effective in studies like the 
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one done by the Center for Disease Control,215 are costly and produce results that may not 
be as immediately apparent to the public as tough sentences for defendants.  As such, 
elected officials' desire to please constituents for re-election purposes make it unlikely 
that they will devote governments' finite resources to programs like the educational 
programs.   
 Because these governments either cannot or will not devote proper attention to 
education and other programs that address the missing protector factor, gang membership 
will likely continue to increase.  Consequently, the criminal justice system is left to focus 
on an aggressive war on gangs using tools like the STEP Act and civil gang injunctions.  
However, as mentioned in Section IV, the STEP Act and civil gang injunctions, as they 
are being used, also involve substantial problems of their own. 
 
b. Law enforcement officials need to enforce anti-gang measures equally to ensure 
that minority gang members are not unfairly singled out. 
 Because states like California fail to prevent youths from joining gangs, gang 
membership has grown tremendously in the last two decades.216 To combat this growth, 
the California legislature enacted the STEP Act, which criminalizes certain aspects of 
gang membership.217 While prosecutors like Ira Reiner have enthusiastically endorsed 
the STEP Act and its ability to fight gangs,218 the Act presents problems when it is 
enforced unequally with respect to gang members of different races.219 The STEP Act 
does not textually provide for unequal treatment for gang members of different races.  
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However, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department officials' failure to classify MLO as 
a gang under the STEP Act raises the possibility that the Act might be failing to meet the 
constitutional requirement that laws be enforced uniformly with respect to similarly 
situated people.220 
This lack of uniformity in a criminal law becomes problematic when similarly 
situated offenders are treated differently.221 If, on the other hand, a law distinguishes 
between different classes of offenders, the distinction will withstand constitutional 
scrutiny if it is not based on an impermissible class like race, but some other rational 
difference.222 The decision not to classify MLO as a gang and possibly prosecute them 
under the STEP Act would, thus, pass constitutional muster if the decision were made on 
some basis other than race.  In other words, to avoid the concern that the STEP Act is 
being applied in an unconstitutional, non-uniform manner, law enforcement officials 
should carefully articulate their reasons for the distinction between gangs and non-gangs.   
 These distinctions could reasonably come due to MLO's smaller size and the fact 
that, as previously mentioned, MLO has not actually killed anyone in its attacks.  
Certainly, allocation of scarce resources could constitute a reasonable ground for making 
such a distinction.  Higher priorities could account for Sheriff's Department officials' 
decision to apply the STEP Act differently with respect to MLO and urban gangs like the 
Crips, Bloods and the 18th Street Gang that have a more pronounced history of violence.   
 If law enforcement fail to articulate the reasons for these distinctions, however, 
the distinctions help lend credence to critics like Gary Stewart.  Dismissing MLO as 
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territorial youth while seeking injunctions against youths like Blanca Gonzalez, who 
happens to dress like a gang member is thought to dress—makes this apparently uneven 
application of the STEP Act and civil gang injunctions appear to come as the result of 
racism within the criminal justice system.  If race is not the reason for the distinction, it is 
important that Los Angeles County Sheriff's officials carefully explain why a group of 
white youths that meets the criteria to be called a gang doesn't receive such a label. 
 
XII. Conclusion 
 With the existing prevalence of gangs and gang violence, it is likely that such 
gangs will be a part of American life for many years to come.  The above criticisms and 
solutions may not have any appreciable impact for years to come.  However, society must 
begin to rectify the current situation by addressing the criminal justice system's 
shortcomings in fighting gang violence.  First, society must remove its focus from 
stereotypical factors thought to cause youths to join gangs and identify the factors that 
actually cause youths to join gangs.  In particular, society should attempt to alleviate the 
problems created by at-risk youths' lack of adequate family support—the missing 
protector factor.  Second, the criminal justice system must ensure that its war on gangs 
neither focuses primarily, unfairly on minorities nor appears to do so.  Law enforcement 
officials must ensure that this war is waged not only on poor, minority gangs, but also on 
affluent, suburban gangs.  Failure to apply enforcement and solutions uniformly across 
racial and economic boundaries will assure the criminal justice system and society in 
general, of failure in the goal of stopping gang violence.   
